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"CARROT AND STICK" SENTENCING:
STRUCTURING INCENTIVES FOR
ORGANIZATIONAL DEFENDANTS
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
The new "Draft Guidelines for Organizational
Defendants" released by the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission on October 25, 1990, explicitly adopt a
"'carrot and stick' approach" to sentencing. While
the boldly instrumental use made of sentencing
penalties and credits in these guidelines will trouble
some, the larger question is whether the Commis-
sion's social engineering will work. Two issues stand
out: First, is the Commission's carrot mightier than
its stick? At first glance, this may seem a surprising
question because the "stick" in the Commission's
guidelines seemingly packs a Ruthian wallop: fines
under the draft guidelines are based on a multiple of
the greater of (a) the pecuniary gain to the defendant,
(b) the pecuniary loss to victims, or (c) an amount
from a fine table, scaled to reflect the seriousness of
the offense, which table goes up to a maximum of
$165,000,000.1 Thus, because the maximum multi-
plier is three, a fine of up to $495,000,000 is author-
ized for the most serious offenses, and, in cases
where a pecuniary gain or loss is readily calculable,
even greater fines could be presumptively required.
Still, this "stick" may be illusory, because the
Commission's "carrot" will often trivialize it. Under
§8C1.2(e), the multiplier can range as high as three,
but if certain mitigating factors are present, it can fall
as low as 0.15. The net result is extraordinary lati-
tude. Assume for example that the base fine is
$1,000,000. The operation of the multiplier then per-
mits the actual fine imposed to range from $3,000,000
(i.e., a multiplier of three) to $150,000 (a multiplier of
0.15). In short, at any given fine level, depending on
the presence or absence of these mitigating factors,
the maximum fine will normally be twenty times the
minimum fine; thus, rather than curtailing historical
sentencing variation, these guidelines may well
increase the range of actual outcomes.
The second issue surrounding the Commission's
use of incentives involves its possible confusion of
ends and means. The introduction to the Commis-
sion's draft indicates that the proposed guidelines
"seek to provide clear incentives for organizations to
strengthen internal mechanisms for deterring, detect-
ing, and reporting criminal conduct by their agents
and employees by providing tough penalties when
organizations fail to take such steps." Ultimately, the
Commission's inventive structure seeks to reward
compliance plans, internal monitoring, and the non-
involvement of senior management in the criminal
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University
Law School.
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activity. These are means to an end-the reduction of
crime-rather than ends in themselves. Although the
relevance of these factors seems clear, the cost of
achieving them in terms of the sentencing goal of
general deterrence is not. The unknown variables
are (1) the degree to which compliance plans and
internal monitoring reduce criminal activity, (2) the
ability of courts to distinguish legitimate, effective
internal monitoring from cosmetic or half-hearted
attempts, and (3) the impact on general deterrence of
reducing fines to a nominal level if such structural
controls and procedures are institutionalized. It is
easy, of course, to conclude that prudence dictates
moderation in the absence of perfect knowledge, but
this comment will conclude with a more specific
suggestion: there is a better way to evaluate the corp-
oration's efforts at crime prevention than to judge
them at the moment of sentencing. Specifically,
mitigation credits should be awarded on a provi-
sional basis, through the vehicle of a suspended
sentence, so that they thus remain subject to forfei-
ture if the organization is involved in related civil or
criminal offenses during a reasonable period of
unsupervised probation.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION'S
PROPOSED MITIGATION CREDITS
Section 8C2.1(e) of the Commission's proposed
guidelines provides for reductions in the multiplier
based on a "mitigation score." In addition, under
§8C2.1(d)(2), the Sentencing Commission has pro-
posed that the "gross pecuniary loss" caused by the
crime would not be considered in determining the
base amount to be so multiplied if "the organization
qualifies for the mitigating factor set forth in
subsection (e)(2)(A)(ii)" (that is, the "effective
program to prevent and detect violations of law.").
2
As a practical matter, my judgment is that in the
case of the large publicly held conglomerate, eight of
the nine possible mitigation points will be awarded
if the corporation's lawyers have done their job
properly.3 The most frequently prosecuted organiza-
tional crimes at the federal level are antitrust viola-
tions, environmental offenses, and governmental
procurement fraud.4 Senior management in a con-
glomerate firm will rarely be implicated in these
offenses, which are necessarily committed at a lower
level of operational management. Hence, the normal
multiplier under §8C2.1(c) will be between 0.35 to
0.55.
In contrast, in the case of privately held firms, the
multiplier is likely to be substantially higher because
in such firms senior management is less separated
from operational details and there may not be any
inside general counsel who monitors governmental
regulators (such as the Sentencing Commission) and
responds to the incentives they create. Thus, fewer
efforts at institutionalizing compliance plans are
likely to have been made in advance of the crime's
commission, and hence mitigation credit under
subdivisions (e)(2)(A)(ii) or (a)(2)(B) of §8C2.1 is less
likely. Typically, only 1-3 points are likely to be
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earned by such firms, thus keeping the multiplier in
the 1.40 to 2.40 range. This estimate raises a basic
policy issue: Do we need greater deterrence in the
case of the large public corporation or the small
private one? In the abstract, the answer may not be
clear. However, even at the level of a 1-2 multiplier,
the Commission's guidelines are likely to result in
bankruptcy for the typical privately held firm that
commits a crime of intermediate severity. Thus,
higher multipliers are realistically possible only in
the case of the large publicly held firm, where they
may be illusory under these proposals. In short the
Commission's carrot is for the large public firm,
while its stick is reserved for the small private firm.
II. THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES AS APPLIED
TO ORGANIZATIONAL DEFENDANTS
On the conceptual level, the Commission's approach
is vulnerable to a variety of criticisms: First, the case
for a "carrot" is more doubtful theoretically than it
first appears. If one wishes "to provide clear
incentives for organizations to strengthen internal
mechanisms for deterring crime," one should only
need to raise penalties in order for the rational
organization to recognize that its own self-interest
lies in improving its internal monitoring. In theory,
the organization should invest in additional monitor-
ing up to the point where the marginal cost of
further controls just equals the expected marginal
benefit. In this light, a "carrot" in the form of
reduced penalties for monitoring could weaken this
incentive to invest in crime prevention to the extent
that it reduces the discounted or expected penalty.
In addition, a perverse incentive may arise to invest
in cosmetic monitoring-that is, monitoring that has
no real impact on employee behavior, but that looks
good at sentencing if the corporation is ever con-
victed. Such monitoring expenditures could be
rationally made much as an insurance premium is
paid, not to prevent the occurrence of the threatened
event, but to reduce the loss if it does occur. At
worst, there is even a danger of the same "moral
hazard" problem that characterizes insurance: once
sufficient "cosmetic" monitoring has been engaged
in to minimize the expected legal penalty, less need
exists to engage in true "preventive" monitoring.
These arguments against any mitigation credit for
internal monitoring systems are open to a counter-
argument: corporations do not commit crimes;
people do. The only purpose of corporate criminal
liability, it can plausibly be asserted, is to encourage
monitoring of the individual agent or agents who
actually commit the crime. No system of monitoring
is foolproof, and thus some crime will still occur,
particularly when the agent's incentives differ from
those of the corporation. Hence, once the corpora-
tion has installed an adequate monitoring system,
there is no need to impose on it socially wasteful
penalties (which only flow through vicariously to
shareholders and others), because the purpose of
corporate criminal liability has already been served.
In effect, the case for a mitigation credit is much the
same as the economic arguments for the superiority
of negligence liability to strict liability: namely, a
negligence system provides effectively equivalent
incentives for the corporation to take due care with-
out making it an insurer for conduct it cannot avert.-
These rival positions boil down to a problematic
empirical question: is corporate crime the product of
"rogue employees" whose personal cost/benefit
calculus leads them to commit crimes, even when it
is not in the corporation's economic self-interest for
such conduct to occur? Or, is corporate crime more
the consequence of subtler organizational pressures
which, while never overtly requiring illegal action,
leave the middle level manager exposed to internal
disciplines when he fails to cut corners or attempts to
comply fully with expensive regulatory programs? If
one believes that "rogue" employees are the cause of
corporate crime, then the most that can be gained
through corporate criminal liability is effective (but
inevitably imperfect) monitoring of employees, and
thus substantial mitigation credits make sense. If,
however, one suspects that pressured employees,
rather than rogue employees, commit what are today
the most frequent corporate crimes-environmental
offenses, antitrust violations, and government pro-
curement fraud 6-- then monitoring alone cannot be
the answer. Indeed, it is even plausible that an
"effective" monitoring system (at least one sufficient
to satisfy a sentencing court) could co-exist with
intensive budgetary pressures within the organiza-
tion to cut corners. In such a world, middle level
managers might fear detection by the corporation's
legal monitoring system, but they would also realize
that financial monitoring for failure to meet profit
and cost-cutting goals would be even more certain to
result in their detection and dismissal. Trapped in
such a "no-win" situation, managers might ration-
ally respond to the more likely danger of ouster for
"insufficient" performance than the more remote
danger of criminal prosecution. If such a state of
affairs is plausible, then a policy of virtually eliminat-
ing the corporate financial sanction simply because
the corporation has installed an effective monitoring
system aggravates, rather than alleviates, this
problem.
III. THE COMMISSION'S ALTERNATIVE
PROPOSAL
It is clear that not all the Commission's members
agree with the approach set forth in the official draft
of its guidelines. Under an alternative version of
§8C2.1(e) that was also published in the draft
proposal, the mitigation score is limited to eight
points, and the multiplier will only be able to go
below 0.55 in the rare case where the corporation
turns itself in prior to any public disclosure or
government investigation. The criteria for awarding
mitigation credits are also substantially tighter under
this alternative section.7
Read side by side, the official and the alternative
draft differ in three principal respects: First, the
alternative version does not give any credit simply
128 Federal Sentencing Reporter November / December 1990
COMMENTARY
because senior management was uninvolved in the
crime. Thus, the substance of §8C2.1(e)(2)(B) of the
official draft does not appear in the alternative draft.
Second, while §8C2.1(e)(2)(D) of the official draft
gives credit if the organization "accepted responsibil-
ity for the offense" prior to sentencing, the alterna-
tive draft awards credit for this easily manipulated
factor only if the organization also commenced "an
internal investigation into responsibility for the
offense" and "commits to take appropriate discipli-
nary action" against those found responsible "in-
cluding through negligent inattention."8 Third, the
alternative draft treats the entire mitigation credit as
forfeitable if the corporation commits another related
violation (whether criminal or civil in character)
during a period of unsupervised probation.9
The alternative draft is far more skeptical of
cosmetics and less willing to place significant weight
on easily stage-managed post-offense conduct. Thus,
it does not reward separately the fact that senior
management was not involved in the crime. The
problem with such a credit is two-fold: First, this
factor typically results in a double-counting of the
effective compliance plan factor;10 and, second, it
may establish exactly the wrong incentive structure.
If sentencing credit is given largely for lack of knowl-
edge on the part of senior management, ignorance is
rewarded. Effectively, the corporations that benefit
from such a credit are those that maintain what some
organization theorists have termed a "structure of
plausible deniability"n-that is, one in which senior
management typically focuses exclusively on
strategic and financial management and leaves
operational details to the divisional management.
Under such a structure, it will be a rare event when
senior management learns in advance of impending
criminal behavior. 12 Thus, the more sensible ap-
proach is that taken by the alternative draft, which
rewards only the implementation of an effective
compliance program and only when senior manage-
ment or compliance officials were not involved.
The alternative draft also declines to reward the
mere acceptance of responsibility by the corporation,
unless the corporation conducts an internal investiga-
tion to determine responsibility within the firm.
While "acceptance of responsibility" may seem an
anthropomorphic fallacy when applied to a legal
fiction, the requirement of a post-mortem investiga-
tion in the alternative draft gives meaningful content
to this provision by addressing an important point
that compliance programs do not necessarily cover.
What if, -for example, there are indications that senior
management either knew, or recklessly ignored,
indications that a criminal conspiracy was in prog-
ress? When E. F. Hutton was convicted in the mid-
1980s for a check-kiting scheme that defrauded its
banks, the trail of complicity led from branch
managers well up into the executive suite. Yet,
internal investigations at this level can be compro-
mised by the fact that the watchdogs have been hired
by those who are to be watched. Although the
alternative draft is somewhat ambiguously phrased
on this point, the optimal procedure would be for
the sentencing court to approve the general structure
of the internal investigation-i.e., what outside
counsel would conduct it, what its scope would
include, whether a formal report would be prepared
and who would see it-before significant mitigation
credit is awarded for undertaking such an investiga-
tion. In effect, the organization should be rewarded
for cleaning house retroactively, not just for estab-
lishing a proactive compliance list. Such a credit
responds directly to the "structure of plausible
deniability" by holding those who fail to monitor
responsible for the organization's liability.
Ultimately, any policy evaluation of the wisdom
of placing substantial sentencing weight on compli-
ance plans or other monitoring systems must recog-
nize that courts are inevitably making decisions
about the adequacy and good faith of such efforts
based on imperfect information. The simplest way
to judge the sufficiency and good faith of an organi-
zation's monitoring efforts and compliance plan is to
observe its subsequent history under that plan. Thus,
perhaps the most important difference between the
official and alternative drafts is the latter's provision
that the total amount of any mitigation credit be
treated as a suspended sentence and the organization
placed under a sentence of unsupervised probation
under a probation condition that it not commit any
related violation during the period of probation,
typically three to five years. 3 Either a new criminal
conviction or related civil violations should trigger a
probation revocation hearing. At this hearing, the
court would have substantial discretion to impose
some, or all, of the suspended sentence, basically on
the premise that the mitigation credit previously
awarded was undeserved. At a stroke, this provi-
sion both gives the court an opportunity to learn if
the compliance plan worked and also places a
financial Sword of Damocles over the head of a
convicted corporation for a limited period.
CONCLUSION
Incentives make sense and should be utilized at
sentencing. Still, the end purpose of sentencing is to
deter and prevent crime, not to force the implemen-
tation of particular monitoring and control strategies
that are still of unproven efficacy and may be
vulnerable to manipulation. When the multiplier
goes as low as 0.15, this approach subordinates the
end of general deterrence to the debatable means of
encouraging the development of internal monitoring
systems. Finally, it is always a mistake to make a
decision prematurely, and thus any mitigation
credits awarded should remain subject to forfeiture
through a probation revocation hearing.
FOOTNOTES
1The sentencing court is not required to use the pecuniary
gain or loss as its base figure where the calculation "would
unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process." See
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§8C2.1(d)(1). However, regardless of the base amount used,
the court is expected to require the disgorgement of any pe-
cuniary gain not otherwise disgorged. See §8C2.1(f). More-
over, because the fine is not counted in determining whether
the gain has been fully disgorged, the potential penalty in
cases where there is a pecuniary gain could be as high as four
times the gain (that is, disgorgement plus the trebled gain).
2 Application Note 7 to §8C2.1 defines the concept of an
"effective program to prevent and detect violations of law."
This definition is excellent, cannot seriously be faulted, and is
probably the best aspect of the proposed guidelines.
Whether sentencing courts will seriously monitor compli-
ance with this standard is another question.
3 Under subdivision (e)(2)(A)(ii) §8C2.1., the organization
gets three points for an "effective" compliance program, and,
under subdivision (e)(2)(B), it receives an additional two
points for the non-involvement of management officials in a
"policy setting or legal compliance position" or who
exercised "substantial authority." However, Application
Note 7 to the commentary to this section indicates that: "An
organization will not ordinarily qualify for the mitigating
factor under subdivision (e)(2)(A)(ii) unless it also qualifies
for the mitigation factor set forth in subdivision (e)(2)(B)." In
effect, if one applies, then the other will also, for a total of
five points. The criteria in subdivision (e)(2)(C) and (D)
involve post-offense conduct and should be generally
available. Indeed, in the case of subdivision (e)(2)(D), which
rewards the acceptance of responsibility, Application Note
11 to the Commentary indicates that the corporation need
not even plead guilty to receive it.
4 See Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update
on Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990 (paper
delivered at George Mason University School of Law
conference on "Sentencing the Corporation," October 1990).
Professor Cohen finds that antitrust offenses accounted for
20-30% of all corporate offenses; government fraud, 20-25%;
and environmental crimes, 10-15%. None of these crimes
result in direct personal benefit to the actor, as in contrast
some securities law offenses do.
I Under both a strict liability and a negligence system of
liability, defendants will take precautions up to the point
where the expected legal liability is equal to the precaution
or avoidance costs. See Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW (3rd ed. 1986) at §6.5. The leading difference between
negligence and strict liability is that victims will take more
precautions and reduce their level of activity under a
negligence system. This latter factor probably deserves
somewhat less weight in the criminal law context when
victims have less reason to know that they are at risk.
6 See note 4 supra.
I Alternative §8c2.1(E):
(e)(1) The minimum and maximum fine multipliers are
those specified in the table below corresponding to the













(2) The mitigation score is determined by totaling the
points specified for each of the applicable factors set out in
subdivisions (A) through (C) below.
(A) If more than one applies, use the greatest:
(i) Add 4 points if the management of
the organization voluntarily and promptly reported the
offense to appropriate governmental authorities prior to
public disclosure, the commencement of a government
investigation, and the imminent threat of disclosure of the
wrongdoing; or
(ii) add 2 points if the organization prior
to the offense had, and after the offense continues to main-
tain, an effective program to prevent and detect violations of
law, and no policy-setting or legal compliance official within
the organization or other person who exercised substantial
managerial authority in carrying out the policies of the
organization had knowledge of the offense, or would have
had such knowledge had such person performed his or her
responsibilities as contemplated by the compliance plan; or
(iii) add 1 point if other factors suggest
that an organization exercised due diligence to prevent and
detect violations of law of a character reasonably similar to
the instant offense.
(B) Add 2 points if the organization cooperated
fully with the government's investigation of the offense.
(C) Add 2 points if the organization:
(i) in a timely manner, prior to the
adjudication of guilt, accepted responsibility for the offense,
and took prompt and reasonable steps to remedy the harm
caused by the offense; and
(ii) commenced, prior to sentencing, an
internal investigation into responsibility for the offense,
pursuant to which it commits to take appropriate discipli-
nary action against officers, employees, or other agents found
to have been responsible, including through negligent
inattention, for the commission of the offense.
'See §8C2.1(e)(2)(C) of the alternative draft. This
requirement should be similarly incorporated into the two
point credit for cooperation with the government under
§8C2.1(e)(2)(B) of the alternative draft. In both cases,
"cooperation" and "acceptance of responsibility" should be
similarly read to require an internal investigation and
allocation of responsibility.
9 See §8Dl.l(a)(4) of the alternative draft.
10 See note 3 supra.
This phrase was coined by Professor Abraham Zalesnik
of the Harvard Business School to describe how chief
executive officers insulated themselves from responsibility.
12 For a general discussion of the relationship between
organizational structures and avoidance of responsibility for
corporate crime, see Coffee, "No Soul to Damn, No Body to
Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate
Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386 (1981).
13 My objectivity in making this assessment can be
questioned because prior to the promulgation of this draft, I
suggested this suspended sentence approach directly to the
Commission.
